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A B S T R A C T
This article addresses a relative gap in the literature on real estate development and property rights in transi-
tional economies, particularly on the “shadow” role of private developers in urban management at the local
level. The paper argues that the development of high-rise buildings in Vietnam resulted from the national pri-
vatization policy shift known as Doi Moi that gave landowners greater rights. These changes in land rights policy
are important constitutive elements for institutional functionality of value capture via privatization of land, to
become viable and eﬀective. Further, the paper describes how private developers (foreign and domestic) take
advantage of vague and indistinct city governance regarding privatization of land, while the property rights of
the original users of the land are insuﬃciently protected. These issues are illuminated and analyzed through the
use of three case studies of commercial projects in Ho Chi Minh City. We suggest a further institutionalization of
privatization of land and value capture in Vietnam.
1. Increasing land values and value capture
International development institutions like the United Nations
(1976) and the World Bank (2015a) have long recognized and stressed
the importance of urban land policy and land rights in the development
process. One of the most important functions that improved policy and
rights in development plays is rationalizing the value capture of land
use and land appreciation, which is often generated by actions from
those other than the landowners; namely, public investments in infra-
structure. This question of value capture has tremendous importance
for the sustainability and viability of the communities that host large
development projects. As a transitional country, Vietnam's main value
capture strategy is based on the privatization of land (Section 3).
However, the insuﬃcient institutionalization of this system and the
absence of clear guidelines may threaten sustainable urban growth in
rapidly expanding cities like Ho Chi Minh City.
Rapidly increasing commercial activities resulting from urbaniza-
tion have generated a high rate of consumption of city-center urban
land. Since the supply of urban land is limited, most of this urban
central growth has taken place through the conversion of land from
residential into commercial use. Because of their unique locations,
urban-center lands often are subject to problems regarding the control
of building development, ineﬃcient land use, extreme land speculation,
and high land prices (Son, 2013; Temelová & Dvořáková, 2012;
Zeković, Vujošević, &Maričić, 2015).
This article addresses privatization of land and value capture in
Vietnam, by focusing particularly on the Central Business District of Ho
Chi Minh City (HCMC), Vietnam, and its micro-planning of the re-
development of the urban center. It examines a new ﬂexible-urban
management mode that has emerged in Vietnam, and contrasts sig-
niﬁcantly with Vietnam's central planning system of the pre-Doi Moi
days. We also question how the public sector and private developers
negotiate privatization and development of land based on long-term
leasehold, to illustrate the critical importance of value capture in a
transitional urban setting. We believe that the research presented in the
article is also relevant for an international audience. The Vietnamese
experiences with a transitional land market can be linked to similar
processes in some other countries and particularly in China, while the
diﬃculties HCMC faces with implementing an eﬃcient and fair value
capture mechanism in a context of underdeveloped regulatory
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institutions can be found in many other developing countries as well.
We explore these issues in Vietnam by presenting three cases of
high-rise building development in the central area of Ho Chi Minh City
built in the late 1990s and early 2000s (See Fig. 1). The case studies
may be seen as narratives that illustrate how underdeveloped reg-
ulatory institutions and a nascent but fast-growing private real estate
sector are at odds in Vietnam.
2. Methodology
This paper is based on a combination of literature review and em-
pirical data. The empirical research is largely based on information
gathered from May to October 2012, from June to August 2013, and
from July to September 2015 in Ho Chi Minh City. The main activities
included an extensive ﬁeld reconnaissance survey, classiﬁed document
searches and interviews with key informants. Information on earlier
construction and discussions of changes in investment relied on inter-
views with staﬀ members of the Ho Chi Minh City Department of
Planning and Architecture (DPA) and Department of Construction
(DoC), two realtors, four developers and two former residents.
Primary data collection was carried out at three commercial projects
in HCMC's District 1 – Times Square, The Lancaster and REE 2 Tower
Project (See Fig. 2). Secondary data and information were also
collected, consisting of government records of city-level and regulations
on center area management. For governance in spatial center areas, in
addition to secondary data, we carried out unstructured interviews with
key informants who work in the center management unit of the DPA.
Finally, potential alternatives to present value capture practice in
HCMC were discussed with several local experts, both from academia
and the public sector.
The paper is organized into seven sections. Section 2 discusses
Vietnam's changing planning system and property rights regime.
Section 3 provides a brief literature review of value capture tools and
discusses value capture mechanisms in Vietnam. Section 4 brieﬂy de-
scribes high-rise development in HCMC. In Section 5, the results of
three case studies of high-rise development in HCMC, including nego-
tiations between public sector and private developers and value capture
practice are presented. Section 6 aims to critically evaluate these cases
and suggests possible needed adjustments to current policy and plan-
ning. Finally, Section 7 concludes the discussion and raises some issues
for further debate and research.
3. Institutional context: the Vietnamese planning system and
property rights regime
The post-1975 housing situation in Vietnam created a number of
Fig. 1. Location of three buildings in HCMC Central Area: 1. Times Square; 2. The Lancaster and 3. REE 2 Tower Project.
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challenges for planners. For about 20 years following the end of the war
with the United States, residents of Ho Chi Minh City tended to upgrade
their houses without any oﬃcial permission from local authorities. This
activity led to hundreds of thousands of upgraded units across the city
that had never been permitted (Scarpaci, 2000). In the context of a war-
damaged city, the scale of this lack of permission and documentation
was particularly extensive. To date, some illegal buildings have been
legalized ex post facto, since excessive construction often happened by
expanding beyond a legal boundary into a common area (see Fig. 3).
This common phenomenon across rapidly developing cities has
generally come about due to an evolving culture and practice of urban
planning, as well as the increasing emphasis of the state on local policy
making.
3.1. Gradual change in the planning system: 1975–1992
Before 1986, planning procedures in Vietnam required extensive
procedural preparations regarding the implementation of a new de-
velopment project. Given the high cost and the long time needed for the
preparation of general plans, there were practically no resources left to
1. Times Square 2. The Lancaster 3. REE Tower 2 (under construction in 
2016)
Fig. 2. Three case studies.
Source: Field Survey, 2016.
Fig. 3. Typical illegal constructions (pink boundary).
Source: DPA, 2011.
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complete detailed plans in many urban areas. Because the general plans
were more convenient in outlying, greenﬁeld areas, urban planning
often paid attention to new built-up areas, at the expense of old city
cores, a practice that resulted in the dilapidation of older settlements.
As private development was not recognized in the investment planning,
neither land nor detailed plans were foreseen for privately built activ-
ities. HCMC was no diﬀerent from other parts of Vietnam, and ac-
cording to Huynh (2015) there was essentially no practical urban
planning in HCMC at all in the de-urbanization period after 1975.
During that period, city planners played an active role in the selection
of factory sites, the functional division of urban land use, and the design
of residential areas. In reality, urban planning often resulted in abstract
plans without any mechanisms for implementation.
After 1986, and especially in 1992, the administration enacted
Decree 91 to improve program implementation under the terms of a
multi-sector market economy (See Fig. 4). A previous, ﬁve-stage plan-
ning style was replaced by a shorter process containing only two types
of plans (master and detailed plans). Master plans are prepared for
feasibility over a 20-year timeline, with updates every ﬁve years. De-
tailed plans are drawn up according to the master plan and prepared at
a scale of 1:500 to 1:2000 for speciﬁc areas. In this new urban planning
process, market-led factors are recognized such as private land use
Fig. 4. (a) Urban development process in the centrally planned economy of Vietnam prior to Doi Moi (before 1986). (b) Mixed factors in the urban development processes in the
transitional economy of Vietnam since 1986.
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rights, individual commercial activities along the streets, and zones for
foreign capital investment. Additionally, a regulatory document is at-
tached to the land use plans to guide construction management.
Nonetheless, although the new law included some innovations, plan-
ning and management remained similar to the past model, in that it was
diﬃcult to implement eﬀectively. In part, this diﬃculty was the result
of unclear property rights.
3.2. Vietnam property rights regime
In countries transitioning from a socialist system to a market-based
one, property rights are the most essential institutional arrangements
that create the framework for a market-based economy. In considering
the functions of property and land rights, it is important to place these
rights in the context of the overall institutional structure within the
society and economy (Feder & Feeny, 1991). Most notably, since the
introduction of Vietnam's ﬁrst Land Law in 1993, consecutive new
versions of this law have led to almost full privatization of property and
land rights, although the present 2013 Land Law does still not allow full
ownership over land (see Appendix A). The situation in Vietnam re-
sembles to a certain extent the present state of the land market in China,
where land is also state-owned and a state-dominated market in long-
leasehold rights over land has developed (Ding, 2007, 2013; Ho, 2017;
Lai, Peng, Li, & Lin, 2014; Perkins, 2009; Shan, Yu, &Wu, 2017;
Sun & Liu, 2016). While selling these long-leasehold rights over land
has become a major source of income for Chinese cities, compensating
for an unbalanced tax system that provides them with insuﬃcient
budgets, the land ﬁnance model also jeopardizes China's sustainable
development because it encourages city governments to sell much more
land than is needed (Zheng, Wang, & Cao, 2014). Similar problems
seem to be found in Vietnam (Thien Thu & Perera, 2011), where cities
lack a local tax base as well (McCluskey & Trinh, 2013) and proper
value capture mechanisms to ﬁnance public infrastructure are missing.
International institutions have already advocated for a long time
value capture as a land policy tool and source of income for cities in
developing countries (Sharan, 2016; Smolka, 2013b; UN-Habitat, 2015;
Walters, 2012; World Bank, 2015b), but in many of these countries
value capture still has not been institutionalized. Present approaches to
value capturing in Vietnam – the topic of this paper – are the result of
continuous changes that took place with respect to the property rights
regime in the period of transition. Although a full analysis of these
changes falls outside the scope of this paper, Table 1 does present an
overview of relevant studies of (transitions in) the property rights re-
gime in Vietnam, covering Vietnam's 30-year-long period of develop-
ment and change under the socialist market economy. In the analysis of
value capturing mechanisms in this paper we will refer to (changes in)
the property rights regime when relevant.
4. Value capture
4.1. Types of value capture
Value capture refers to the process by which all, or a portion of,
increments in land value attributed to “community-level interventions”
- often taking the form of improved infrastructure - rather than land-
owner actions, are recouped by the public sector and used for public
purposes. These “unearned increments” may be captured indirectly
through their conversion into public revenues as taxes, fees, exactions
or other ﬁscal means, or directly through on-site improvements to
beneﬁt the broader community (Alterman, 2011). In principle, there is
a connection between spatial planning and land value because any
improvements to neighborhoods, local infrastructure and services are
reﬂected in appreciating value to any of the land aﬀected by these
changes. Additionally, since central cities have the greatest number of
factors likely to aﬀect neighborhood-scale characteristics, the number
of potentially inﬂuencing factors is the highest, and the magnitude of
investment is highest on a per-square-foot basis. Thus, securing even a
small share of the increase in central city property values is a signiﬁcant
asset that goes to raise the value to the individual landowner (private or
corporate) and to the local government in helping to pay for reinvest-
ment in local infrastructure.
The international value capture literature continues to discuss various
aspects of value capture, most notably: (1) the rationale behind value
(Alterman, 2011; Rodríguez-Bachiller, Thomas, &Walker, 1992); (2) the
eﬀectiveness of tools and mechanisms for value capturing (Huxley, 2009;
Smolka, 2013b; Smolka&Amborski, 2000; Tira, Van der Krabben, &Zanon,
2011; Van der Krabben&Needham, 2008; Walters, 2012); (3) how much
value can be captured (Cervero, 1994; Smith&Gihring, 2006); and (4) the
institutionalization of value capture in planning regulation and land law
(Alexander, 2012). Alterman (2011) distinguishes three important sets of
policies that inﬂuence value capture: (1) macro-economic policy, (2) direct
regulation, and (3) indirect instruments. Macro policy includes substitution
of private property by long-term public leaseholds, land banking, and land
readjustment. It also comprises nationalization or privatization of all land
under long-term use rights and transferability, something many former so-
cialist countries have done. Land readjustment is an advanced device that
can be deployed as a macro instrument (Van der Krabben&Needham,
2008). Direct regulation covers taxes on land or increment taxes upon
transfer title and raises an annual property tax or capital gains tax on
property. And indirect instruments for value capture are exactions, cost
recovery, or infrastructure-based betterment capture and development-
rights based betterment.
Value capture instruments that charge for building rights – also
referred to as exactions – have provided partial or full funding for major
urban redevelopment projects in many cities (Smolka, 2013a). Charges
for being allowed additional building rights are based on the separation
of building rights from land ownership rights, which allows the public
to recover the land value increment resulting from development rights
over and above an established baseline. Exactions are fees aimed to
force the developer to pay for a suitable share of the infrastructure that
assists the public development under discussion (Evans-Cowley, 2008).
For example, in-kind contributions of facilities built by the developer
and given to the city are exactions. Other examples can be found where
the state requires the land sub divider to allocate a certain percentage of
the area for aﬀordable housing (Darosa, 2007), referred to as inclu-
sionary housing in some localities (Calavita &Mallach, 2009).
Indirect value capture through exaction fees is perhaps the most
eﬀective form of value capture, ﬂexible enough to adapt to diﬀering
institutional contexts and regulatory environments. Overall, a relatively
large amount of literature in developed countries on value capture in
urban land redevelopment provides a number of alternatives for urban
planners and managers, but the lack of studies on this topic in devel-
oping countries makes it diﬃcult to develop policy reforms for urban
value capture with any level of conﬁdence.
4.2. Value capture in Vietnam
Value capture in Vietnam primarily relates to the ‘privatization’ of
land. As a form of land banking, public authorities clear land by com-
pensating the existing users, either voluntarily or by expropriation (the
users hold long-term user rights, but the land is still owned by the state)
and then sell long-term leasehold rights over the land against full
commercial market value to a private developer. Though the land is not
fully privatized - the private developer does not receive full ownership
over the land, but a long-term leasehold right - the city authorities
nevertheless generate income by trading the user right that can be used
for infrastructure provision or any other purpose. This practice is an
example of what Gerber, Nahrath, and Hartmann (2017) call “the
strategic use of time-limited property rights,” and is a convenient way
for the state to maintain some limited control over land use – seemingly
an extremely important power under conditions of rapid change. While
their cases from Switzerland are from a very diﬀerent political and
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economic context, the importance of blurred lines between the public
and private rights to land is common to the state's ability to do long
term land use planning both in the Global North and South. Although
not the same as private ownership in an absolute sense, we call this
granting of rights “privatization” because it shifts land use rights closer
to the private end of a spectrum. In Vietnam, two main privatization
strategies are used. The ﬁrst strategy concerns the direct sale of long-
term leasehold rights over land to a private developer. The city au-
thorities are free to decide how to use the income. The second strategy
is referred to as the Land-for-Infrastructure mechanism (Labbé &Musil,
2014): as an in-kind payment for the construction of new public in-
frastructure, the developer receives leasehold rights over a piece of land
that will be allocated for a certain urban use category (residential,
commercial). In both strategies, the city authorities must facilitate the
process by clearing the land. To clear the land of residents, local au-
thorities must buy them out or expropriate their land to allow the
transformation of the location into its new use.
While in some European countries (Switzerland, the Netherlands),
the strategic use of long-term leasehold over land (‘ground leases’) has
contributed to increased ﬂexibility in and eﬀectiveness of land-use
planning (Gerber et al., 2017), the opposite seems to be true in coun-
tries like China and Vietnam, where all land is state-owned. Though the
privatization strategies are rather eﬀective in capitalizing and capturing
all increment value as the result of assigning an urban use category to a
certain area, the system as it is applied in Vietnam has been criticized
for several reasons. First, social issues appear. Labbé and Musil (2014)
criticize the system that deﬁnes compensations paid to the original
users. In the early 1990s Vietnam introduced a land valuation me-
chanism known as the ‘Land Pricing Framework’ (LPF): ‘this is a state-
stipulated price chart used to determine the compensations to which
households are entitled when the lands on which they have use-rights
are expropriated for redevelopment’ (Labbé and Musil, p. 7). In practice
the ‘set’ compensation values for lands create a signiﬁcant rent gap with
the ‘market’ values for lands. Thien Thu and Perera (2011) have re-
ferred to this as ‘dual-price-system’. The rent gap – purposefully in-
stitutionalized by the state – ‘creates, in practice, a large reserve of
cheap, periurban land which can easily be expropriated and re-
developed when investment opportunities arise’ (Labbé and Musil, p.
7).
Second, the Land-for-Infrastructure mechanism has fuelled urbani-
zation at the periphery of Vietnamese cities, often resulting in urban
sprawl and poor-quality urban areas with insuﬃcient and un-
coordinated public infrastructure. Labbé and Musil (2014) argue: ‘(a)
common problem is that developers prioritize the construction of
commodity housing, commercial buildings and oﬃce space at the ex-
pense of the non-marketable, public components in projects. In some
cases, the construction of public amenities is delayed by several years.
In others, developers modify approved plans and use areas originally
earmarked for public amenities for the construction of commodity
housing and commercial buildings’.
Third, Huynh (2015) states that these privatization strategies open
the way for negotiations between city authorities and private devel-
opers, in the absence of a clearly institutionalized system. In practice,
the inﬂuence of private developers has caused frequent changes to be
made to plans. Huynh (p. 16) claims: ‘(i)t is hard to deny the inﬂuence
of private developers in shaping the urban planning in HCMC. The
process of city building has in reality been determined by real estate
developers (some say speculators)’. Only recently, according to Huynh
(2015), has the municipal government oﬃcially acknowledged the in-
ﬂuence of developers on the city's urban planning and expressed con-
cern about the negative impacts of such inﬂuence.
Finally, above we referred to similar practices in China, where cities'
reliance on income from land sales leads to unsustainable urban de-
velopment.
5. Commercial development in Ho Chi Minh City and value
capture
As a result of the more stable political situation created by joining
the World Trade Organization and the eﬀect of many global companies'
“China plus one policy”,1 Vietnam has now become an attractive place
to invest. Hence, the number of high-rise buildings increased in the
center of HCMC to supply the demand of oﬃce space and hotels from
Table 1
Summary: Results of urban and property rights development studies in Vietnam during the transition period.
Post socialist planned economy Transitional economy Socialist market economy
Phase I: 1986–1991 Phase II: 1992–2002 Phase III: 2003–2013
Background 1. Centralization of decision making
emerging of local developmental state
(Fforde, 2010).
2. Government located housing with very
low rent price (Quang & Kammeier, 2002)
1. Urban reforms recognized legal transfer of land use
rights (Hare, 2008).
2. The local government's tight budget is inadequate
for the ambitious urban redevelopment
(McCluskey & Trinh, 2013).
Under the coalition, it was found:
1. Uncertainty of redevelopment ﬂexible planning
control (Xuan et al., 2012)
2. Issues of housing for low income people (Waibel,
Eckert, Bose, &Martin, 2007)
Property rights
evolution
No laws regulating the use and ownership
of property (Gillespiet, 1998).
Introduction of the ﬁrst land laws with prime concept
of ownership, resulting in widespread speculation and
soaring prices (Thien Thu & Perera, 2011).
Property rights over land for real estate development
now clearer deﬁned (Zhu, 2011).
Occurrence of ‘tragedies of the anticommons’ and
owners' strategies to deal with them (Nguyen, Van der
Krabben, & Samsura, 2016)
Physical result Little redevelopment in CBD Rapid large scale urban redevelopment with negative
externalities (McPherson, 2012)
Gentriﬁcation, as the result of the emergence of a new
middle class (Vinh & Leaf, 1996)
Rush of foreign developers to Ho Chi Minh City and
Hanoi Capital, led to numerous new commercial and
luxury developments (Huynh, 2014)
Institutional result 1. Centrally planned housing system -
distribution by the State (Phe, 2002)
2. Increased housing demand
1.Resident's socialist land use rights phase out 1. Introduction of new land law in 2013
2. Increased foreign investment, increasing incomes
and emerging mortgage market.(Tan, 2010)
Real Estate Market Non-existent formal real estate market
(Kim, 2004)
Many failed foreign projects due to the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis (Dapice et al., 2009).
Condominiums and mix-use oﬃce-commercial
developments replace traditional shop houses
(Huong & Sajor, 2010)
‘Divided’ commercial real estate market foreign and
domestic investors (Nguyen, van der
Krabben, & Samsura, 2014)
1 To be less dependent on their investments in Chinese manufacturing industry, many
global companies decided to start additional operations in other Asian countries. Vietnam
has largely beneﬁtted from this (Bradsher, 2008).
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the mid-1990s to 2000s. Whether central areas in Ho Chi Minh City
were destined to become “gold land” – as it is referred to in Vietnamese
- for the building of high-rises or not depended upon receiving favor-
able permitting reviews from the relevant local authorities. Currently,
there is no set standard for limiting the height of proposed projects, so
high-rise buildings in HCMC have been developing according to such
personalized permitting procedures, and are generally untethered – or
only loosely tethered – to the government's master plan (Son, 2013).
This inconsistency has, predictably, resulted in terrible pressures on
traﬃc, drainage and the electrical grid system of the downtown area.
5.1. A high-rise building trend in mega HCMC
Before 1975, there were few high-rise buildings in Districts 1 and 5.
From 1975 to the end of 1980, the city did not develop any new
buildings due to a lack of demand and resulting diﬃculties securing
ﬁnance. In the early years of the 1990s, revisions of the Land Law
contributed greatly to economic transition by stimulating the private
sector in HCMC empowered by FDI in real estate help the city to build
new high-rise oﬃce buildings in the center area in District 1 (Huynh,
2014; Nguyen et al., 2014). The new wave of constructing commercial
and residential high-rise buildings from local and foreign investors
physically changed the image of the whole city (Fig. 5).
Since this time, buildings kept rising higher and higher, and struc-
tures of 30 to 40 ﬂoors became more common. In 2008, Saigon Trade
Center (37 Ton Duc Thang st) was the tallest building in the city with 33
ﬂoors. In May of 2010, the tallest was the two towers of Saigon Pearl at
Nguyen Huu Canh st with 37 ﬂoors; by October 2010, it was Financial
Tower (Bitexco) with 68 ﬂoors, and in July 2014, the city approved the
Tan Cang Complex project with 80 ﬂoors. High-rise apartment projects
are also popping up at the sub-urban fringe in Districts 2, 7 and 9, all of
which have well-established local urban infrastructure. From 2009 to
2012, most of the new commercial, residential project applications
were high-rise projects either at the sub-urban (such as District 2, Tan
Phu and Binh Tan districts) or rural area (such as Hoc Mon, Binh Chanh
and Nha Be districts).
The high-rise trend in these recent decades brought positive results
for the city. In 2010, the city had around 225 high-rise building projects
(Ho Chi Minh City Department of Construction, 2012). In the period
between 2008 and 2012, the HCMC Department of Construction ap-
proved 104 high-rise projects, among which 41 were located in the
central area. Those projects have contributed greatly to the economy of
the city, increased land use value, reduced housing prices, and met the
demand for oﬃce and hotel space. This high-rise wave provided a so-
lution for a broken land redevelopment process, generating new land
banks for open space or public use, and upgrading the infrastructure of
the city.
5.2. Problem
There are some challenges that also arose during this period: de-
velopment happened outside of the city's control, comprehensive and
detailed plans were not ready to accommodate the rapid development
of the time, and the real estate market had too strong an inﬂuence on
the management and development of the city. Since there was a lack of
high-rise landscape studies, the haphazard approval of high-rise pro-
jects was not required to contribute to any needed additional public
infrastructure facilities. The projects that were permitted and crowded
in the center, inherited the existing infrastructure, which was often
inadequate for the additional density. The locations were chosen based
on the interest and capacity of a developer, not on infrastructure fea-
sibility.
More recently, the HCMC Authorities have recognized these lim-
itations and added several measures to solve the problem in high-rise
management and development. They developed detailed urban design
plans for 930 ha in the central area, Thu Thiem district, and Vo Van Kiet
Boulevard. The Department of Architecture and Planning also was
empowered with some general principles, guidelines and detailed
master plans to develop high-rises in core-urban, new urban and sub-
urban areas depending on population (Kien, 2015). However, it has not
yet seen the value being captured to recover the cost of those eﬀorts
made to build the infrastructure that has made the new high-rise de-
velopments possible. The following case studies illustrate the need for
value capture mechanisms to sustainably develop high-rise buildings in
HCMC.
6. Three illustrative case studies
Each of the following three cases shows how planners and real es-
tate developers can potentially, and in one case have, formally and
informally collaborated to resolve the complex aspects of a property
rights regime under rapid change conditions. Each reveals a learning
process that may eventually become more institutionalized. Case 1 and
2 show problems of missing value capture opportunities, and case 3
presents how capturing the public value in commercial projects has
begun to happen.
6.1. Case study 1: Times Square, District 1
Currently, Van Thinh Phat Company runs this building. Saigon
Times Square began as an FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) project in
HCMC's District 1 that had been privately owned before 1975 and
served as a famous hotel that had been known as the “Dem Mau Hong”
(Pink Night). When the war ended on April 30, 1975, the new com-
munist authority nationalized this property – along with countless
Fig. 5. New high-rise buildings are replacing tube house in
District 1.
Source: Field Survey, 2016.
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others throughout the city – and changed it into a public apartment
building. In doing so, the city authority transferred land use rights to
the Ministry of Light Industry (Southern Oﬃce), which used it to house
its staﬀ. In 1995, after serving for 20 years in this capacity, the city
authorities decided to transform this property into a commercial
building complex. The following year, a partnership (Times Square
Vietnam) was licensed between Hong Kong's Larkhall Corporation and
domestic partners Savico, Pharmaceutical Company No. 2 and Light
Industrial Construction Company No. 2. The foreign and domestic
partners owned 70% and 30%, respectively, in land use rights on the
4500-square-meter site (USA International Business Publications,
2008).
This commercial project (See Fig. 6) was projected to cost an esti-
mated US$ 125 million to build. At that time, 96 households lived in the
building and had to be moved to clear the land. Savico took the lead in
helping the foreign developers negotiate with each household, and in
the end, each apartment (24 m2) was compensated with an average of
US$ 20,000 to move out (source: informal information received from
resident). With this amount, each family could aﬀord to buy a small
house (50 m2) oﬀ an alley, typically found in most suburban districts of
Ho Chi Minh City in 1996–1997. This process took about one year to
complete, and by 1997 the project was ready for ground breaking and
construction.
Upon completion of this phase, the partnership approached the re-
levant authorities to get necessary approvals to construct a high-rise
building (old name was Larkhall Savico Tower) on their piece of landed
property. After various administrative procedures, the relevant autho-
rities granted them permission to build a maximum amount of 39
stories.
Unfortunately for the developers, construction was postponed be-
cause of the Asian economic crisis in 1997, and the project site was
leased out on a temporary basis for building a commercial center to be
operated by Kinh Do Corp. and Savico as a “holding” move. After some
years being used for this temporary purpose, Time Square Vietnam
Company decided in 2007 to collaborate with other local developers,
Van Thinh Phat and Saigon Peninsula Company, to improve the ﬁ-
nancial basis for the project. Total investment cost increased from US
$95 million to US$ 125 million. In addition to the change in ownership
structure, this sale shifted the project structure from a joint state-private
partnership to one that was 100% Hong Kong private owned – a legal
change that had been formalized in the intervening years. At this time
of transfer, the project value needed to be appraised based on the lo-
cation of the land and the number of stories that had been allowed,
which was 39. However, after the transaction occurred, the new owner
succeeded in negotiating with the local authority to upgrade to a 45-
story building, under the new name of Times Square.
In addition to this vertical expansion of developable “land”, the new
developers negotiated other favorable agreements with the local plan-
ners. What had been a large retailing area within the project was shifted
oﬀsite to adjacent hotels and residential areas, thereby making the new
project design even more proﬁtable than the original project. This
change allowed a greater number of hotel rooms on the site. The pre-
viously required 11,562 m2 of retail space was reduced to 2003 m2, and
the previously allowed 231 hotel rooms increased to 285 rooms (see
Table 2). From a planning standpoint, this shift in use meant that de-
velopers had been allowed to change the function of the project from
temporary use to permanent activities in the building. In doing so, it
increased the revenue for developers but also put additional pressure on
Site clearance in 2000 Status: 35 years land lease from 1995  
Construction: 2005-2012 
Total construction floor: 90 000 m2 
Capital: US$ 125 mil  (year 1999) 
Height: 163.8 m, 45-story tower 
Investor: Times Square Vietnam  
Fig. 6. Times Square project proﬁle.
Source: Department of Urban Planning and Architecture, and Google map accessed in 2011.
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the urban infrastructure (electric, water, parking, etc.) without any
additional public revenue for upgrading.
The project was completed and opened in December 2014, and the
resulting 163.8 m height project included two 45-stories towers with
features of a modern architectural style (See Fig. 7).
The important issue regarding this project's changing parameters
was the diﬀerence between proposed designs and completed buildings. The
discrepancy between the old and new approvals was six stories (see
Table 2), which means that it entailed nine thousand square meter
diﬀerence in GFA. With each square meter in this central business
district area valued at greater than US$ 3300 (1999), the variance from
the original permit approximately added over US$ 27 million to the
project's market value, all of which accrued to the developer (minus
additional construction costs) without any beneﬁts to the local gov-
ernment that could be used to oﬀset the increased burden on the
neighborhood infrastructure. Moreover, the lease period was extended
from 35 to 45 years, which adds to the value of the investment as well,
also without any additional value captured by the local government. In
eﬀect, the result was a transfer of value from the local authorities to the
developer, as well as their acceptance of additional unfunded respon-
sibilities for infrastructure and services provision. The real question is
whether the construction and realization of the Times Square project
Table 2
Application for changing function of the Times Square Project.a
Source: Ho Chi Minh City Department of Urban Planning and Architecture, 2009.
Order Categories Norm
The approval plan
(Larkhall Savico Tower)
The changed plan
(Time Square)
1 Area 4.573 m2 4.573 m2
2 Floor 39 stories + 1 basement + 3 technical basements 45 stories + 1 basement + 3 technical basements
3 Height of buildinga 163.8 m 163.8 m
4 Building Coverage Ratio
(BCR)
63.9% 60%
5 Floor Area Ratio (FAR) 17 15.8
6 Width of the road Đồng Khởi Street: 20 m
Nguyễn Huệ Street: 64 m
Đồng Khởi Street: 20 m
Nguyễn Huệ Street: 64 m
7 Distance from the roadside Back side of the basement to Đồng Khởi street: 12.5 m
Back side of the basement to Nguyễn Huệ street: 5 m South West border:
4.5 m – 6.4 m North East border: 4 m – 7 m
Back side of the basement to Đồng Khởi street: 5.5 m
Back side of the basement to Nguyễn Huệ street: 5 m
South West border: 4–7 m
North East border: 4.5–6.4 m
8 Total gross ﬂoor area (m2) 84,704 m2 (including technical ﬂoor 5161 m2) 90,878 m2 (including: basement: 12,294 m2, technical ﬂoor:
5876 m2 and roof 650 m2)
9 Parking Basement, from ﬂoor 4 to motorcycle ﬂoor 8: 275 car parking and 500
motorcycle parking
Ground ﬂoor, basement 1, basement 2 and basement 3: 150
car parking
10 Hotel 231 rooms from ﬂoor 12 to ﬂoor 29 of the tower orient to Nguyễn Huệ road 285 rooms from ﬂoor 12 to ﬂoor 29 of the tower orient to
Nguyễn Huệ road
11 Deluxe apartment for rent 118 apartments from ﬂoor 12 to ﬂoor 36 of the tower direct to Dong Khoi
and Nguyen Hue street
120 apartments from ﬂoor 12 to ﬂoor 36 of the tower direct
to Dong Khoi Street
12 Restaurant Floor 38 Canceled
13 Top Floor for city View Floor 39 On the roof
14 Helicopter parking Top Top
15 Retail Area 11.562 m2 Reduced to 2.003 m2 (the area shifted to hotel and
apartment)
16 Lease 35 years from 1995 45 years from 2005
a The developer reduced the height of each ﬂoor from 3.9 to 3.5 m.
Fig. 7. Times Square is much taller than other buildings in
the downtown area.
Source: Field Survey, 2015.
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were worth these subsidies and future liabilities.
6.2. Case study 2: Lancaster, District 1
Together with the Times Square project, after the war ended in
1975, the HCMC People's Committee (executive arm of the People's
Council) occupied a location in downtown HCMC that later became
known as The Lancaster (See Fig. 8). Under the old regime, this site of
the former Oﬃce of the Navy was allocated to two state-owned en-
terprises: The Saigon Housing Business-Construction Company and
Saigon Industry. These new occupants used the site as oﬃce space for
30 years. Early in February 2003, however, the HCMC People's Com-
mittee decided to take back the land use rights and organized a land
auction.
The Ho Chi Minh City Auction of Land Use Rights Council organized
the ﬁrst auction of land No. 22-22 Bis Le Thanh Ton Street, Ben Nghe
Ward, District 1 in 2004. At that time, the HCMC People's Committee
approved the starting price for this 1169 m2 parcel of land at US$ 32
million (53 billion VND). A private, domestic company won the bidding
at the price of US$ 39 million with a proposed 12-ﬂoor project. The
winner, Trung Thuy Limited Company, became the new owner under a
40-year lease for the plot, and broke ground for the Lancaster Oﬃce
Building Project one year later.
Two and a half years later, the Lancaster project was completed and
began operating in February 2007. With modern facilities, ﬁrst-class
designs, and a convenient location, the Lancaster building was an ex-
cellent residential and working environment. Because of these rare
amenities, the developers were able to sell 90% of the apartments and
rent out a similar percentage of the oﬃce space by the time the project
was complete. Under the 2004 project proposal that had been per-
mitted, the oﬃces and apartments in the building would be sold for US$
2000 per square meter, but actually, the real prices in that neighbor-
hood had risen to double that amount by 2007. The price of the land in
the downtown area relied not only on the location but also the “rights
of constructing high-rise building” licensed from the authority.
However, there was no clear regulation for this. Urban plans did not
deﬁne how many rights could be obtained in a certain area.
Whereas, at the start of the project the investor was granted a 40-
year lease period for the land, surprisingly, this 40 year lease had been
changed to one with no end date, thereby eﬀectively converting from
leasehold to freehold by 2007 (information from apartment owner,
September 2013). This was a clear advantage over other apartment
buildings in District 1 that only received 49-year ownership leases.
Thus, by extending the leasehold duration to an indeﬁnite term roughly
equivalent to freehold ownership, the local authorities had eﬀectively
increased the value of all apartments in the project exponentially. The
developer also raised the height of building from 12 ﬂoors to 22 ﬂoors
(see Table 3). Again, this ad-hoc increased valuation of the project not
only created developer proﬁts but also made changes in such a way that
the local authorities could not share in that increased valuation.
Beyond the inconsistencies in leases and ownership introduced by
this change, the case of The Lancaster also exhibits the importance of
arbitrary height variances for the broader issue of value capture. The
case study of The Lancaster project on Le Thanh Ton Street showed that
this site could make twenty-two ﬂoors, while it initially only held
permission for twelve ﬂoors, and two slots next to it were allowed only
ten ﬂoors. This height constraint was also a common fact in other
streets in the Central Business District, and there was no clear criteria
making decisions on permitting variances on the height of a project.
The city also recognized this limitation, and HCMC authority decided to
introduce more detailed master plans – down to the 1/2000 scale - for
the entire Central Business District (CBD) area in 2013 (Sơn, 2014).
Two state companies had the location in 
use for 30 years until 2005
An aero Image of Lancaster area from 2007
• Status: Long term use  
• Construction: 2004-2006
• Number of floors: 24 
• Surface area: 1,169.5 m2
• Building Uses: Office-Condo 
• Structural Types: high-rise 
• Architect: SWA Vietnam Co. Ltd. 
The Lancaster in 2012
Fig. 8. The Lancaster project proﬁle.
Source: Field survey, Ho Chi Minh City
Department of Construction and Apple Maps,
2013.
Table 3
Application for changing of the Lancaster Project.
Source: Ho Chi Minh City Department of Urban Planning and Architecture, 2009.
Categories Before After
Status 40 years Perpetual lease
Function Public service, commercial,
hotel and oﬃce
Condominium, oﬃce
Construction norm FAR: 6, BCR: 50%, stories: 12 FAR: 9, BCR: 50%, stories:
22
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6.3. Case study 3-REE Tower 2 Project, District 4: applied value capturing
The previous two case studies described the eﬀects of an apparent
high level of confusion among the city authorities on how to decide the
value of a construction project, particularly as the policy and regula-
tions change mid-way through project implementation. In large part a
response to these challenges, the city established a new system to
handle this issue of project valuation.
Decision 6708/QD-UBNN on 29/12/2012 is the ﬁrst critical Zoning
Plan for the 930 ha of the Center Area (See Fig. 1), and our third case
study illustrates how projects are now treated. In sum, this ﬁrst-ever
zoning plan states clearly how much the developer could develop in
terms of height, coeﬃcient and buﬀering from the road.
REE Tower 2 is located in District 4, inside the 930 ha center zoning
(See Fig. 9). Originally, the City owned the Friendship trading-in-
dustrial Joint Stock Company (FRIENDCO), and used the 5503 m2 site
primarily as storage space. In 2009, the HCMC PC decided to prohibit
the storage function because it was polluting the neighborhood, and
eventually transferred it to the Open University for use as a temporary
branch campus through 2013.
Still owned by FRIENDCO, the land became a joint-venture com-
mercial development agreement in 2013 with the Refrigeration
Electrical Engineering Corporation (REE Corp). REE Corp invests $54,5
million, including $13,6 million of total construction investment, and
$40,9 million for land use rights of 50 years to develop a high-rise
commercial building. The joint-venture created the Song Mai Company
to run the project, including securing the land from the City at a market
price, and under the condition that they must break ground for the
building within a year after the land use rights were granted.
Song Mai plans to have a complete A oﬃce building (luxury), REE
Tower 2 by 2017, on a total land area of 4588 m2, with a total ﬂoor
space of 66,000 m2 on 27 ﬂoors (See Table 4). The developer wants to
have 35,000 m2 rentable area with underground ﬁve levels of parking
(16,000 m2).
Prior to the current plans, FRIENDCO called for investment in this
project in 2005. The Global company (a local real estate developer) was
interested at that time in this land. Both sides had an initial agreement
to develop the project. Decree 11/HN/TCKT formed a joint venture
among three companies: The Global Company - 65% (by capital),
FRIENDCO - 20% and Saigon Industry Corporation (CNS) - 15% (by
land). The Global Company was responsible for the investment proce-
dure, and in doing so they were able to change the storage function to
commercial use by inﬂuencing the regulators on land use rights. Two
years later, FRIENDCO decided to terminate its partnership with The
Global Company, thereby making this arrangement moot. After several
years resolving these partnership problems, REE Land stepped in as a
substitute for the Global Company as a new partner to continue the
project in 2014.
However, immediately after securing the investment certiﬁcate, the
developer found that the proposal construction amount would not be
proﬁtable enough for them to process investment. They proposed some
changes according to Article 6 of the regulation, suggesting that if the
developer could contribute to the city community, they would get a
higher land use coeﬃcient based on their contribution. By law, the
Department of Urban Planning and Architecture (DUPA) could discuss
with the developer about their reasonable extension publicly, which is
still in the range of the 930 ha City Center Plan.
The Department of Urban Planning and Architecture approved the
developer's original construction plan that allowed for 27 ﬂoors and a
total of 100-meter height, one block, 40% land coverage, and setbacks
Fig. 9. Land location of REE Tower 2: 11 Doan Van Bo St, District 4.
Source: Google Map, 2014.
Table 4
Land use information of project.
Source: DPA, 2015.
Function Area (m2)
Oﬃce and commercial building 1764.9
Public park 527
Public open space 1406.3
Internal transportation 890
Total 4588
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between 6 m and 20 m, depending on the street façade (Fig. 10).
Under this plan, DUPA allowed a land use coeﬃcient of only 5. To
make the project proﬁtable, however, FRIENCO asked for a higher
coeﬃcient ratio if they ﬁnancially contributed to the public road across
the project in the short term, and let the public access the open space on
their two projects for the longer term (see Fig. 10). The City Urban
Planning Committee approved the request for a new land use coeﬃcient
of 10, thereby making the project proﬁtable for the developer, while at
the same time contributing to the road and open space infrastructure of
the neighborhood (Decision #547/SQHKT-QHKTT). DUPA calculated
the new coeﬃcient based on the following scores in the Table 5.
This case shows that the city authorities have begun to apply eco-
nomic instruments to urban management. For the ﬁrst time, the de-
veloper proposed value capturing in advance instead of being forced to
do so. In the past, the city authority had regulatory authority to require
the developer to provide green space for the public, or suitable height
according to zoning laws, but usually the developers did not follow
them, seeing only restrictions on their proﬁtability. Thus, under this
new model, DUPA can achieve its planning goals by making appropriate
value-adding adjustments to projects in a more collaborative manner. If
the municipality is able to multiply this value capturing model to other
projects, the city manager stands to gain much more green (open) space
for the whole center area as well as for the entire city, than under the
old regulatory practices (Fig. 11).
7. Discussion
We found substantial changes between proposed designs and
Fig. 10. Master Plan of REE 2 (case three) – with a park preserved for public use (#4).
Table 5
Coeﬃcient changes.
Source: Ho Chi Minh City Department of Urban Planning and Architecture, 2015.
Reasons Bonus
Friendly environmental plan +1
Suitable parcel and land sharp +1
Land close to the big road (> 30 m wide) +1
Add a green space in project +0.5
Preserve 30% of land for public-use park +1
Make a segment of Doan Nhu Hai road +0.5
Total +5
a. b
Fig. 11. REE 2 Tower is under construction and
will be completed in 2018.
Source: http://www.skyscrapercity.com/.
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completed constructions with regard to three high-rise projects in
HCMC. The cases of Times Square, The Lancaster, and REE Tower
suggest that the ad-hoc, not-institutionalized nature of permitting de-
velopment in HCMC provides numerous opportunities for developers to
strategically negotiate with individuals in local government in an en-
vironment of policy ambiguity. These ambiguities related to retail/re-
sidential mix, height variances, and ownership duration terms have all
marked missed opportunities for local authorities and their con-
stituencies to share in increased project values.
This lack of a set of guidelines allowed the developers to take ad-
vantage of the local authorities at what may be the expense of the
neighborhood communities. While a strict legal environment for value
capture may be a valid long-term objective, the rapid rate of growth
and development in urban areas suggest that this will take a long time
to develop. In the interim, however, it does appear that the problem of
institutional structure might – in the short- and medium-term – be
addressed by increasing the capacities and technical assistance re-
sources of local authorities. Each of these projects was constructed on
land that was openly auctioned in Ho Chi Minh City, a ground-breaking
practice at the time, and therefore the subject of much public and
private scrutiny. In general, the case of Times Square suggests that
project transfers and post-permitting negotiations are common pro-
blems that might be systematically addressed through policies more
accommodating of long-term valuation and the permitting process. The
case of The Lancaster illustrates how the context of Vietnam's particular
land ownership laws can create value that is often not captured by state
entities through the variance of ownership duration terms. Finally, the
case of 3 REE shows that some collaborative and creative joint micro-
scale planning between local authorities and developers can result in
adequate capture of value to the public through private infrastructure
investments.
Alexander (2012) argues that institutional design is critical for ef-
fective value capture. Rationalizing public and private land value
capture achieves a number of important objectives. First, regional
economic stabilization and ﬁscal decentralization allow local munici-
palities to be ﬂexible in management to deal with developers, and en-
courages them to contribute to city revenues, thereby making local
authorities less dependent on funding from the central government, and
weaning local authorities away from the unsustainable practice of land
sales to cover recurring public expenditures (He, Zhou, & Huang, 2016).
Secondly, more progressive strategies for urban planning and man-
agement avoid planning by blue print, encourage private market actors
to cooperate with other public and private entities, and decide what
they would like to develop. Thirdly, rationalizing value capture en-
courages clearer property rights, increases social awareness, and sup-
ports a more equitable distribution of beneﬁts. To achieve this ﬂex-
ibility, market cooperation, and transparency, value capture
rationalization must conform to the broader processes of changing at-
titudes toward privatization and public-private partnerships in
Vietnam, whereby private developers are recognized as partners, not as
actors to control.
8. Conclusions and recommendation
Transformations comprise forming institutions, laws, regulations,
plans and actions (Alnsour, 2016). In Ho Chi Minh City, the emergence
and development of high-rise buildings have been driven by broad
policy shifts to the privatization of property rights. Substantial ﬂex-
ibility in plan implementation provides the conditions for private de-
velopers to be unoﬃcially acknowledged by state planners as a com-
plementary set of institutions in land and property development. This
ﬂexibility is also an explanation for why many city plans are often
adjusted signiﬁcantly once they move from plan to implementation. By
allowing for such variances, yielding, and delegating decision-making
autonomy to individual developers, the state has established private
developers as major stakeholders in redevelopment and assigned them
the status of co-partners in development at the local level. What they
are currently learning now is how to capture value for the public as
these variances are allocated. While this model dominates many mu-
nicipal planning and development processes in the United States and
Europe, this kind of urban public-private-partnership in Vietnam is new
territory in urban governance, and operates without signiﬁcant controls
and incentives mitigating pure developer interests. In Vietnam, the
development of this kind of public-private-partnership for urban man-
agement was enabled by ambiguous policy reforms and general plans
that focused on macro issues rather than development projects. The
case studies in this paper provide narratives of the impact of this am-
biguity on the micro level, and it is through the negotiation of these
kinds of projects that institutional models will become more formal.
McCluskey and Trinh (2013) argue that other, more structural land
based revenue sources, including property and land tax, are at present
unsustainable in Vietnam, lack buoyancy and represent a declining
revenue base. Property tax reform is needed to improve the income base
of Vietnamese cities, in the perspective of future demand for all kinds of
new infrastructure. Moreover, eﬀective tools are still missing to capture
part of the value increase that appeared as a result of adaptations to the
original plan. Without these tools, with negotiations taking place on a
case-by-case basis and with insuﬃcient transparency in the negotiation
processes, planners are in a weak position. With the privatization of
land use rights and housing ownership in the open policy, Vietnam is
applying market economy mechanisms in restructuring land manage-
ment to encourage investment. It has yet to be seen whether this reform
will result in a better designed and better functioning downtown built
environment.
The issue is not one of ownership per se but the manner in which the
relations between market, state and civil society are resolved over time.
While in China and post-socialist cities in the Eastern European coun-
tries the move to private property rights seems to lead to sprawl, the
Vietnamese example is the opposite, where developers are not only
building in the core but trying hard to build higher and higher, which is
a mark of the so-called compact city. Value capture mechanisms make
for better coordination between land use planners and investor interest
in spatial planning. New, policy-oriented thinking on the details of
exactions and charges for building rights will be an increasingly useful
tool in urban growth management and land-based ﬁnance for urban
development. With such mechanisms in place, eventually private de-
velopers will need to balance their plans with city interests better, and
this practice has already begun to take root.
More broadly, the case studies presented here contribute to a sorely
needed body of research on how planners and real estate developers
collaboratively negotiate and align interests to enable the very complex
built projects that facilitate urbanization across rapidly developing re-
gions.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank community members and experts
who kindly contributed their time to discuss these projects with us, and
we hope they will ultimately be the beneﬁciaries of any policy reforms
related to value capture. The research is partially supported by the Ho
Chi Minh City Open University (Project No. E2016.7.7.1). Any mistakes
or errors, of course, are the authors' alone.
T.B. Nguyen et al. Cities xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
13
Appendix A. Property rights in Vietnam Land Law 2013
Source: Han and Vu (2008).
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